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ABSTRACT 
ANALYSIS AND EFFECT DF THE EDWARDS V. AGUILLARD DECISIDN ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL BASES TO TEACH CREATION-SCIENCE AND CURRENT LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Robert Russell Melnick 
Attorney. Melnick & Schwebel. Youngs-
town, Ohio 
Thl~ paper probes the Edwards v. Aguillat"d decision of the United States Supreme Court. The 
rullng does not forbid the teaching of creation-science in the public school classroom; it 
only prohibits state legislatures from mandating its introduction into the science curriculum 
under 'Balanced Treatment' laws. Individual teachers, school boards and districts remain 
free to introduce creation-science provided the information is presented in a secular fashion. 
Co~parison of case-law and precedent reveals that the Supreme Court majority opinion of reli-
gious purpose is untenable. It;s ba$ed not on adherance to legal procedure or the legal 
record but on the Court's subjective notion of creation as inextricably linked with Protes-
tant Fundamentali sm. 
The decision. however, does not abrogate well-established constitutional rights to free 
speech, academic freedom, etc., if emanating from the individual teacher or school board. 
Analysis of case-precedent supports this conclusion. Finally, misinterpretation of Aguillard 
by the lower courts is ~isplayec by the Webster v. New Lenox case. The current struggle of 
the ICR graduate school to maintain its science curriculum in the face of state hostility 
over its creation curriculum indicates increasing attempts by the evolutionist majority to 
censor the minority view on origins. 
INTRODUCTION 
This analysis serves to inform the reader of the scope of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Edwards v. A,uillard and the legal/constitutional status to teach creation-science in the 
public schoo classroom subsequent to this ruling. Further. this paper analyzes current 
legal developments and their effect on the teaching of the creation n~del. 
Contrary to popular notion, the Edwards v. Aguillard decision did not render illegal the 
teaching of creation-science in the classroom. Rather. it prohibited passage of legislation 
mandating the teaching of creation-science. This analysis then critiques the ruling in order 
to comprehend its scope. 
The Court's finding of religious purpose and motivation by the legislators who sponsored and 
voted for this bill was utter speculation, prompted, as the ringing Scalia dissent points out, 
by the Court's bias against the very concept of creation. Thi~ orejudice blinded the Court 
to t~ factual disputes evident on the record before them (at the Summary Judgment stage 
the existence of factual disputes r:landa t es that a case go to trial under federal procedural 
rules). 
The constitutional right to teach creaton-science after Aguillard remains intact, but the 
focus now must be on the individual teacher, school board and Jistrict. Rights of free speech/ 
expression, academic freedom, and the right to receive information are bases to pursue under 
the First Amendment if one is denied the right to disseminate information on creation-science. 
The introduction of creation-science serves to enhance the science curriculum, thus satisfying 
the Tinker test. 
One post-Aguillard case involving a social-studies teacher in Illinois has attempted to 
create an unfounded Jistinction between mentioning creation-science in a church-state setting, 
and teaching about it as science. It is now being appealed. Finally, the California Depart-
ment of Education's de-approval of the ICR graduate school as a degree-granting institution 
serves to emphasize the well-entrenched establishment bias against creationism as a minority 
scientific view on origins. 
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ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF EDWARDS V. AGUILLARD 
Scope of the Decision 
The long-anticipated outcome concerning the constitutionality of the Louisiana Balanced Treat-
ment law culminated in a decision by the United States Supreme Court on June 19. 1987. (1) 
Despite anti creationist claims to the contrary,(2) the ruling was a narrow one and does not 
prohibit the teaching of scientific evidences for creation in the classroom. Rather. the de-
cision refines how such teaching can occur. 
Specifically. the High Court in Ed"ards v. Aguillard ruled that no state legislature through 
statute can require that creation-science be taught whenever evolution was presented. (3) The 
Court claimed that to mandate the teaching of both views on origins constituted a violation 
of the Establishment Clause based upon the statutory terms and legislative history of the 
"Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction 
Act."(4) 
However. the decision still permits passage of statutes allowing for the introduction of sci-
entific information with a secular intent: 
We do not imply that a legislature could never require that scientific 
critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught ... teaching a va-
riety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind to school-
children might be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of science instruction.(S) 
Presumably, if a state legislature passes a statute that does evince a secular and nonreli-
gious purpose, then this ruling will not effect it. Further, as stated below, Aguillard does 
not implicate the constitutional right of instructors to voluntarily teach creation-science 
in the science classroom. (6) It only invalidates a state-sponsored law requiring the teaching 
of creation-science alongside of evolution-science. 
Critical Commentary on Edwards v. Aguillard 
Lemon v. Kurtzman test: In analyzing cases that may implicate the Establishment Clause, the 
Supreme Court since 1971 has developed a three-pronged test: "First, the statute must have a 
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive entangle-
ment with religion. "'(7) This tripartite test on its face appears to be a balancing schema, 
i.e., if scrutinized legislation or activity benefits religion or has rel.igious content inciden-
tally, but primarily has a secular purpose and effect, presumably it satisfies the test. How-
ever, the Court has never applied the test as such. (8) In practice, where the issue of reli-
9ion is even raised in an Establishment Clause context (as with the teaching of creationism), 
the High Court's use of the tripartite test has been too cumbersome to make fine distinctions 
between incidental religious purpose and effect versus primary secular purpose and effect. (9) 
Hence " ... although it appears to be a balancing test, it operates more like an absolute test." 
(10) 
Secular versus Religious Motive/Intent: Ignoring the voluminous record before them that point-
ed to a secular purpose by the Louisiana legislators in passing the Balanced Treatment Act, 
(11) the majority of the High Court chose instead to draw not upon the legal record before 
them, but again on their assumptions of what the motivations of the legislators who passed the 
bill must have been. (12) In effect, the majority supplanted their extrinsic and subjective 
biases for the record they are bound to follow- an ominous trend all the more heightened in 
impact because it is sealed with the force of judicial fiat.(13) 
The majority flagrantly violated many of the High Court's own well-established rules in re-
viewing statutes with regard to determining legislative intent in Aguillard. First, the judi-
ciary is required to review the intent, motive and purpose of the entire legislature in as-
sessing motive.(14) Nevertheless, the majority opinion cites isolated remarks of Senator 
Bill Keith(15). and the concurring opinion focuses more on the 11980 bill that was not passed 
than the 1981 bill that was.(16) The general rule was supposed to be that even the contempo-
raneous remarks of a single legislator who sponsors a bill are not controlling in analyzing 
the legislative history.(17) 
Secondly, a stated legislative purpose in a statute is to be presumed valid.(18) The sponsor 
of the bill, Bill Keith, and one of his expert proponents, Dr. Edward Bondreaux, emphasized 
repeatedly in the legislative hearings that the purpose of the bill was to advocate academic 
freedom.(19) This avowed secular purpose was reiterated at every hearing. (20) Despite a record 
replete with evidence of a secular purpose, the majority claims that the statement is a sham. 
(21) Such a conclusion is unfounded. indicati"ng that a majority of the members of the U.S. 
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Supreme Court as constituted in 1987 were guided by their own predilections than a careful 
scrutinizing of the evidence before them on Summary Judgment. (22) 
Mere mention of creation in late twentieth century America evokes images of Fundamentalist 
repression; the Scopes trial; bigotry, etc.--a knee-jerk reaction--to which the mail.ority 
succumbs. As Justice Scalia states in his forceful dissent: 
We have ... no adequate basis for disbelieving the secular purpose set forth 
in the Act itself, or for concluding that it is a sham enacted to conceal 
the legislators' violation of their oaths of office. I am astonished by the 
Court's unprecedented readiness to reach such a conclusion, which I can only 
attribute to an intellectual predisposition created by the facts and legend 
of Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927)--an instructive reac-
tion that any governmentally imposed requirement bearing upon the teaching of 
evolution must be a manifestation of Chr i stian fundamentalist repression. In 
this case, however, it seems to me the Court's position is the repressive one.(23) 
The Court's Finding of 'Religious' Purpose is Skewed: The Court's Es tablishment Clause juris-
prudence centers around its understanding of a secular versus religious purpose. the first 
prong of the Lemon test above. Justice Scalia's dissent--that the ruling is a visceral one--
is rf;\'<~alcu Tri"'dnalyzing one Justice's fonnulation of the Lemon v. Kurtzman purpose require-
ment. Justice O'Conner's view is instructive. Her formulation seeks to uncover the govern-
ment's actual purpose--is it to advance or disparage religious activity?(24) The focus is not 
on the mere presence of a secular purpose (e.g., the statutory reference to a secular purpose 
in the louisiana Balanced Treatment law) but a probing to determine the actual impetus for 
passage of the legislation.(25) In Wallace v. Jaffree,(26) J ustice O' Conner elucidated her 
construct of secular purpose as that WhlCh clearly is discernible as secular or religious by 
the judiciary versus a legislative 'sham': 
I have little doubt that our courts are capable of distinguishing a sham 
secular purpose for a sincere one ... (27 ) 
The danger in this formulation is twofold. First, Justice O'Conner in her Jaffree concurrence 
and a majority of the Court in Aguillard, provide no concrete , objective method for discover-
ing such a sham. Instead we are back to the gut. visceral fee11l1g h ! know it when I see it 
approach. Thi s Scopes in reverse ruling totally disregarded that this was a Summary Judgment 
action,(28) precluding by definition judgment where there are geniune factual issues in dis-
pute. Disputes about the religious versus secular mo t ivation of the legislators, definition of 
statutory terms, expert affidavits re evidences supporting creation-science versus evolution 
and a host of other matters mandated reversal of the Summary Judgment granted the plainbffs 
in the lower courts. (29) That the result was otherwise s ~ggests that t he course of this na-
tion and its public policy, as reflected here at the highest level of the juJiciary ( ... Iith re-
gard to the facts about origins taught in her public school classrooms) is thoroughly imbued 
with an evolutionary mind-set, predisposed toward naturalism as the only explanation for ori-
gins. (30) 
Secondly, commentators have decried this 'gut-level' interpretation of secular purpose in the 
lemon test above. because it is applied in a manner that i s overly inclusive of religious pur-
pose and underinclusive of a secular purpose. (31) Instead of focusing upon the secular purpose 
of neutralizing evolution or balancing the teaching of orig ins from a secular standpoint, the 
Aguillard majority underincludes the secular aspect, overincluding the state endorsement of 
religion element. (32) 
Perhaps the most insidious example of this in application is claiming a religious purpose by 
the mere mention of the word 'creation.' (cf.definition of creation-science in louisiana 
statute: " ... the scientific evidences forc reation and inferences from those scientific 
evidences. LA STAT. REV. ANN. §17:286.3 (West Supp. 1982)). Appellants repeatedly and with 
scholarly adroitness showed that use of the word 'creation' or 'Creator' di d not translate 
into a religious purpose in contravention to the Establishment Clause. (33) Justice Scalia 
likewise at the oral argument in Aguillard.(34) and in his dissent establishes that to posit 
a creator is not synonymous with religious intent: 
(T)o posit a past creator is not to posit the eternal and personal God who 
is the object of religious veneration. Indeed it is not even to posit the 
'unmoved mover' hypothesized by Aristot l e and other notably nonfundamenta l -
ist philosophers. (35) 
An analysis emphasizing the secular purpose should have found compliance with the Lemon test 
supra, recognizing that the passage of the Louisiana Balanced Treatment act was to neutralize 
the exclusive teaching of evolution in origins and promote academic freedom. (36) However. 
the Aguillard majority dismisses the avowed basis for the act. terming the statutory definition 
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for Academic Freedom unworkable (Aguillard. 482 U.S. at 586 & n. 6) because the Act serves to 
diMinish such freedom by requiring teachers to instruct in evolution and creation. It;s as 
if the majority decides this in a vacuum, without any apparent knowledge of the rampant dis-
crimination by the evolutionist establishment both within the public school setting,(37) and 
the scientific community as a whole. (38) 
Justice Scalia's dissent makes clear that if the majority can decide to invalidate the law 
from its innate sense of the creation-evolution debate as opposed to the strict record before 
the court. then the majority cannot then determine to look at the statutory wording and find 
inherent discrimination on the face of the statute {i.e., protecting creation-science and not 
evolution-sc;ence),wh;ch obviously needed no protection in the current educational and scien-
tific climate. Cf. Aguillard. supra at 630-32 ("La. legislators were told repeatedly that 
creation-scientists were scorned by most educators and scientists ..... (39)). Query: Why else 
the need for balanced treatment? If both viewpoints needed protection, the law should have 
been called 'Mandated Instruction in Origins' or something similar but surely not "balanced". 
Emphasis was given only to the creation-science side of the ledger; after all, the creation-
ists are the ones suffering the discrimination.(40) All this apparently escaped the 'gut' 
knowledge of the majority which defines Academic Freedom to justify their skewed decision. As 
Justice Scalia finds, Academic Freedom here simply means, freedom from indoctrination. (41) 
CONSTITUTIONAL BASES TO TEACH CREATlON-SCIENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS ARE UNCHANGEO BY EOWARDS 
V. AGUILLARD OECISION IF IIWIVlDUALLY-IrIITIATEO 
Individual Constitutional Bases Remain Intact 
Despite invigored efforts by the anticreationist establishment to claim the teaching of crea-
tion-science in light of Aguillard is illegal in the classroom,(42) the right of the indivi-
dual instructor, school board. or district to implement a creationist curriculum has not been 
legally abrogated by the Aguillard decision. The Aguillard majority acknowledges such in its 
references to teaching about a variety of scientific theories concerning origins from a secu-
lar perspective. (43) The voluntary, individual decision of a public school instructor to dis-
seminate information about creation-science remains intact! Such rights flow from individual-
ly-centered constitutional bases,(44) not state legislation, the latter of which was the focus 
of the Aguillard decision. 
These constitutional bases include the following. First, a First Amendment, free speech/ex-
pression right to impart information on creation-science on the part of the teacher (since 
there is inherent scientific content to creation-science(4S}). There has been a judiCial 
trend 'toward encouraging student exposure to a broad variety of viewpoints and ideas' ,(46) 
and a concomitant emphasis upon the free expression rights of teachers to teach ideas that 
are not endorsed by a majority vote of their cOlleagues.(47) Secondly, a right to freely ex-
plore and debate a subject under the heading of Academic Freedom is constitutionally-based and 
available to teachers and students alike~ with the latter also being able to assert a right to 
receive information (which includes creation-science).(4B) 
Tinker Test 
The standard used to measure whether the state can limit or suppress freedom of expression on 
public school premises (for teachers and students).(49) is that enumerated in Tinker v. Des 
Moines School District. (SO) Unless the state can show a material or substantial lnterference 
with school work or discipline, free speech rights cannot be suppressed by school authorities. 
In the creation context, teaching about an alternative body of scientific information re ori-
gins hardly c~-:n be deemed an interference with the school curriculum or a threat to discipline. 
In all respects. it is an equitable balancing of the science curriculum that satisfies the 
Tinker standard. It is a geniune marketplace of ideas that the Supreme Court claims to be the 
prevalent understanding of the First Amendment. (51) 
Aside from the establishment of religion issue (which is unfounded on the premise that crea-
tion-science is inherently scientific(S2»), the state must show that it has a compelling in-
terest to deny the introduction of creation-science information in the classroom. (53) The 
state has no compelling interest in teaching evolution or creation for that matter,(54) but 
if one is permitted to be taught than the other must be allowed under any equitable analysis 
of constitutional case-law.{5S) 
POST-AGUILLARD LEGAL STATUS (1987-1990) 
Litigation 
Since the Aguillard decision, there has been scant activity in the courts to pursue the teach-
ing and disseminating of creation-science on a voluntary. individually-centered constitutional 
basis. PubliCity has focused upon state and local-level textbook selection and science-cur-
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riculum committees in various states,(S6) t . 1 d . 1 a lne u e cne~t'on-science teaching in the curric-
u urn or as part of the content of science textbooks publlshed. litigation has been minimal. 
. O~e notable exception is Ra~ Webster v. New Lenox School District,(5?) where a teacher 
m Illln~ls flled SUlt to dlsseunnate lnformation on creation While Webster is the fO t 
~ost-A9Ull1ard ca~e to judic~ally test the extent of the Aguiilard holding, the facts ~~Sthe 
~s~hare not p~eclsely on.polnt. Mr. Webster is a social studies instructor. so the decision 
~laSS~O~~~(;8}111 not strlctly apply to the teaching of creation-science within the science 
Mr. Webster was informed by a supe~i~r that the ~ourts have forbidden teaching in creation and 
that he.was t? cea~e from such actlvlty.(59) It 1S Plaintiff-Webster's contention that he is 
merel~ lnformlng hlS st~den~s of an.alternative scientific viewpoint without endorsing or ad-
vocatln~ a pe~so~al bellef ln creat,on or evolution. (60) Since social studies is a required 
course 1n 1111n01s, and the issue of origins ;s the· first chapter of the mandated curriculum 
t:he subject of origins in this context cannot be avoided. ' 
The d!str~ct co~rt ruled to dismiss plaintiff's claim, in an apparent attempt to avoid the 
constltutlonal lssues and for that matter, a fair appraisal of the scope of Aguillard. The 
d~stric~ cour~ held that plaintiff Webster had never been denied the right to mention crea-
tlon-sclence 1n an historical context of church-state relations as distinguished from teaching 
it as a science.(61) Apparently, the court by this ludicrous result, dilutes the effective-
ness of any appeal to decide the ultimate issue of the constitutionality of teaching creation-
science, and concomitantly gets the matter dismissed for the subject school district despite 
the latter's blatant violation of First Amendment rights. 
California Department of Education Denies ICR Graduate School License to Grant Science 
Degrees 
The most ominous legal development since the Aguillard decision centers around the efforts of 
anticreationist William Honig. California State Department of Education Superintendent to 
disenfranchise the graduate school at the Institute For Creation Research. (62) ICR, the pre-
eminent creationist think~tank, has operated a degree-granting graduate school in the sciences 
since 1981.(63) At that time, as is required by the California Education Code,(64) the state 
superintendent and an onsite reviewing committee granted the ICR graduate school authority 
to grant science degrees which are taught from a creationist perspective. The required state 
license approval continued by the state reviewing committee through August, 1988.(65} 
However, apparently buoyed by intense anticreationist lobbying against the graduate school, 
(66) Mr. Honig in an incredible political 'power play' (which obviously impinges upon the 
integrity of the reviewing corrmittee) pressured one cO!T11llttee member to change his vote, re-
sulting in denial of state approval. (67) The objections of the state committee were petty, 
evidencing a strong anti creationist bias with intent to deny a foregone conclusion. Without 
a state license to grant sc ience degrees. the integrity of the ICR program, the ability of 
students to obtain all-important financial aid through government sources, etc .• will be com-
promised(68) and the school will likely close. 
The California Department of Education's dictating of the content of the science curriculum 
at ICR is another example of increasing government control and regulation of private educa-
tion, ostensibly in contravention to the First Amendment as originally intended. (69) As of 
March, 1990. the state department of education has ordered the school closed unless ICR ca-
pitulates (which it will not and should not do) and recasts its science offerings in the 
name of 'religion' or 'creation'. ICR intends to litigate this matter in the appropriate 
administrative and judicial forums. (70) 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the scope of the Edwards v. Aguillard decision is narrow. However, unless 
public school administrators and teachers alike understand that the constitutional right 
to teach creation-science remains intact for the individual instructor and school board, 
the decision will have a chilling effect . School officials. not given to distinguishing 
legal decisions. will be more incl ined to prohibit creation-science. Public school teachers 
and university instructors need to be armed with the facts and educate officials at school 
board hearings, conferences or other similar fact-finding forums. This would a1leviate much 
of the misinformation that leads to litigation. 
Post-Aguillard litigation, if Webster is at all an indication, is construing the decision 
too broadly against individual constitutional rights. The controversy currently raging 
against the ICR graduate school reveals the extent of the evolution millLsct ar.long the edu-
cational and scientific elite. To counter these on-going threats. creationists must press 
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their minority position on~ origins \-/ith increased- v1g£lr and deterr.li:l:ltion. 
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